Synopsis: Wars outlive their reasons because budgets, alliances and manufactured fear come to depend on them, until peace itself becomes an institutional threat. From the strikes on Iran to Pine Gap, AUKUS and this week’s Shenzhen summit, a case for restoring peace as the default condition of international life.
There’s something profoundly disturbing about the pattern of destruction now unfolding in the war against Iran. Reports of American attacks on a girls’ school, universities, infrastructure and a wedding gathering have been accompanied by Iranian retaliatory strikes against American military installations and other targets. Each incident must be independently established and judged according to the same standards of international humanitarian law. There can be no selective morality in the protection of civilian life.
But the larger question remains. Who are the barbarians here? And why do governments persist in strategies whose foreseeable consequences include the deaths of civilians, the destruction of essential infrastructure and the strengthening of precisely the resistance they claim to be trying to weaken and overcome?
What kind of strategic intelligence imagines that bombing a population into submission will produce enduring political legitimacy? What kind of political imagination confuses the ability to inflict damage with the ability to create a stable and peaceful order?
The problem extends well beyond the immediate conflict. It exposes a deeper pathology in the way powerful states understand security, sovereignty and their place in the world. Military superiority has increasingly become a poor substitute for political intelligence. The capacity to destroy has come to count for more than the capacity to understand, negotiate or make peace.
And behind this lies an even more consequential possibility: that war has become not simply an instrument of foreign policy, but an enduring feature of the political and economic systems that administer it.
The psychology of resistance
One of the oldest and most persistent errors in the conduct of war is the assumption that overwhelming force will eventually break the will of a population. It’s an assumption that repeatedly mistakes fear for submission and physical destruction for political victory.
Yet external aggression can produce the opposite result. A population divided by internal political, religious or ideological differences may discover a powerful common identity when confronted by a foreign military threat. People who may profoundly disagree with their government can nevertheless reject the idea that another country has the right to determine their future through bombardment.
This distinction matters particularly in the case of Iran. Opposition to the Islamic Republic does not automatically translate into support for American or Israeli military intervention. Nor does dissatisfaction with a government mean that its citizens welcome the destruction of the country in which they were born, educated and raise their children.
A foreign power may believe it is weakening a regime, while simultaneously strengthening the national solidarity on which that regime can draw. In many respects this is a false belief. It might destroy buildings, communication networks, roads and power stations, but it simply can’t assume that by wreaking so much destruction it has destroyed the political identity, historical memory or collective resolve of the people who inhabit that country. Indeed, the more a population experiences the conflict as an assault on its sovereignty and national way of life, the more likely it is that resistance will acquire a significance beyond the government being defended.
I’m not arguing that every act of resistance is justified, or that governments should be immune from criticism just because they are attacked from abroad. It’s an observation about the limits of coercive power. People don’t necessarily surrender their right to determine their own future simply because a foreign state possesses superior weapons. The failure to understand this is not only a military miscalculation. It’s a catastrophic failure of political imagination.
The arrogance of power
There’s a recurring assumption in the conduct of great-power politics that military strength confers a corresponding entitlement to determine the behaviour of other nations. It’s an assumption that has survived the collapse of empires, the end of colonial rule and the repeated failures of military intervention. It remains embedded in the strategic culture of states that have become accustomed to interpreting their own security interests as if they were universal obligations. But the sovereignty of other nations is not a discretionary privilege granted by the powerful over the less powerful. Nor is national independence conditional upon conformity with the political preferences of Washington, Beijing, Moscow, London or any other capital for that matter.
A country may be difficult, adversarial, ideologically different or even openly hostile to another state. None of these conditions automatically confers a right to invade it, overthrow its government or reorganise its political institutions - by force or any other means.
This is where the conduct of powerful states becomes especially dangerous. They can become so inured to the exercise of power that they lose the ability to acknowledge the legitimacy of political arrangements beyond their own preferred model. Difference becomes a threat. Independence becomes defiance. Resistance becomes evidence of hostility. And the refusal to comply is taken as a reason to apply more force. The result is a self-reinforcing logic in which the exercise of power generates resistance, resistance is presented as confirmation of the original threat, and the resulting confrontation becomes the justification for still more power.
A strategy that can’t distinguish between a genuine threat and an unwillingness to submit is not a strategy for security. It’s a prescription for permanent antagonism.
When military superiority replaces strategic intelligence
The history of modern intervention offers ample evidence of the limitations of military superiority.
Vietnam demonstrated that the world’s most powerful military could inflict enormous destruction without achieving its political objectives. Afghanistan demonstrated the difficulty of imposing an external political order on a society whose historical, cultural and tribal realities were inadequately understood by those seeking to transform it. Iraq demonstrated how the removal of a government could unleash consequences that military planners had neither sufficiently anticipated nor subsequently possessed the capacity to control. These were not simply failures of execution. They exposed a deeper weakness in the rulebooks underpinning the interventions themselves.
The recurring response to strategic failure has too often been to increase the application of the same instrument that contributed to the failure in the first place. More troops, more weapons, more covert surveillance, more funding, more intelligence operations and more elaborate military doctrines are brought to bear on problems whose origins are political, historical, social and cultural.
When the desired outcome fails to materialise, the response is frequently to intensify the effort rather than question the assumptions that made the effort necessary.
This is one of the defining characteristics of institutional dysfunction. Rather than fundamentally reconsidering their policies, institutional arrangements and governing assumptions, organisations increasingly invest in managing the consequences of their own shortcomings. The equivalent stance from a military point of view is the conviction that a failure to achieve political objectives through force demonstrates the need for more force. It’s a profoundly expensive way of avoiding the truth.
The strategic interests behind the war
Yet the conflict with Iran can’t be understood solely through the psychology of political leaders, their henchmen, or the cultural dynamics of military institutions. There are substantial strategic interests at stake.
Iran occupies a consequential position in the Middle East. Its relationship with Israel, its influence across the region, its military capabilities, its disputed nuclear programme, its relationships with Russia and China, and its geographical position adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz all have serious implications for international security and the global economy.
The Strait of Hormuz is particularly significant because of its role in the movement of oil and gas. Any sustained disruption would have consequences extending far beyond the immediate region, affecting energy prices, supply chains, economic confidence and the interests of those situated half a world away that have no direct involvement in the conflict. Israel’s security concerns, the United States’ regional military posture, the actual and perceived balance of power in the Middle East and the wider competition for influence are all part of the strategic landscape.
These interests are real. They should not be dismissed or treated as irrelevant. But their existence does not establish that war is the most intelligent or legitimate means of pursuing them. Indeed, one might have thought that the more consequential the interests involved, the greater the obligation to exercise strategic restraint and political judgement. The danger is that the pursuit of strategic advantage becomes confused with the pursuit of dominance. Policies intended to preserve security can become an attempt to impose a preferred regional order, while any resistance it then generates is used to justify further intervention.
This is the true meaning of the term folly. The distinction between protecting legitimate interests and attempting to control the political destiny of other nations is not a minor one. It is fundamental.
The political economy of permanent conflict
There’s another reason why wars can become so difficult to end, even when their strategic rationale becomes increasingly questionable. War creates an economy of its own.
Military contractors, arms manufacturers, technology companies, logistics providers, intelligence organisations, research institutions and an extensive network of allied interests become embedded in the machinery of national security. Governments allocate enormous budgets to weapons systems, military infrastructure, research programmes and long-term procurement arrangements. Political constituencies emerge around these expenditures, while employment, investment and regional economic activity become connected to the continuation of military commitments.
What sustains it is a system in which powerful interests benefit from the continuation of particular policies, while the costs of those policies are dispersed across taxpayers, civilians, soldiers and future generations. The incentives can align without anyone needing to coordinate them.
The military-industrial complex identified by President Dwight Eisenhower in his farewell address in 1961 was not simply a warning about the influence of arms manufacturers. It was a warning about the potential relationship between military institutions, commercial interests and political power. He understood that an enormous defence establishment could acquire an influence that extended beyond the legitimate requirements of national security. His warning has become even more relevant in an age of increasingly sophisticated weaponry, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, cyberwarfare, satellite surveillance and the privatisation of military capabilities.
The economics of war are no longer confined to the manufacture of guns, tanks and aircraft. They encompass entire technological ecosystems, research programmes, data infrastructures and commercial relationships that can become dependent on continuing military expenditure.
The political economy of permanent conflict is therefore not necessarily sustained by a conscious desire for war. It can be sustained by the accumulated interests, institutional habits and economic dependencies that make the continuation of conflict easier to accommodate than its resolution.
When war becomes self-perpetuating
There’s a further institutional dynamic at work. Once a war has started, governments become increasingly invested in its justification. Political leaders have made commitments, not only to their citizens but to each other. Military commanders have established objectives. Budgets have been approved. Alliances have been mobilised. Public statements have raised expectations. Now, the credibility of governments and institutions becomes entangled with the outcome.
To withdraw or change direction can be portrayed as weakness, defeat or an admission of error. To continue, by contrast, can be presented as determination, resolve or a necessary demonstration of strength.
The original objectives may gradually become obscured by the imperative to vindicate what’s been done already. When the enemy doesn’t instantly surrender, the explanation may be that the campaign requires more time. When the strategy fails, more resources are requested. When civilian resistance increases, it’s interpreted as evidence of the enemy’s continuing hostility. And when the regional consequences become more dangerous, the knee-jerk response is to expand the military commitment.
The war acquires a momentum of its own. Its original purpose can become almost incidental to the institutional necessity of continuing it. New threats are identified, new objectives announced and new reasons offered for why the conflict cannot yet be brought to an end. This is how wars carry on long after the political assumptions that gave rise to them have been discredited. And it’s why the concept of the forever war is so disturbing. It describes something more than a conflict without a clear conclusion. It describes a system that increasingly finds its identity, resources and justification in the continuation of conflict itself.
The institutional cost of peace
There’s an uncomfortable corollary to this argument. If political and economic systems become organised around the expectation of conflict, peace can begin to threaten the very arrangements that have grown up in its absence.
A lasting settlement can threaten budgets, institutional mandates and commercial expectations built around the anticipation of future confrontation.
The interests involved may be entirely legitimate in their origins. Governments have obligations to protect their citizens, and those who serve in uniform often pay a real price for doing so. Yet the belief that every nation requires armed forces of its own is almost never examined. It has hardened into an article of faith so complete that to question it sounds naive or even crazy. Costa Rica abolished its army in 1948 and redirected the money towards schools and clinics. Iceland has no standing army. Panama dismantled its military in 1990, and Liechtenstein disbanded its own in 1868 without being absorbed by its neighbours. Each case has its own history, and most of these states shelter within larger arrangements of treaty or alliance. That’s the point. Security can be held in common, through neutrality, regional guarantees and the slow cultivation of trust, as readily as it can be hoarded behind a single border. Even where a defence requirement is genuine, its existence doesn’t justify an unlimited expansion of the institutions built to satisfy it.
Nor does it follow that every perceived threat must be answered through military enlargement.
The problem arises when the apparatus of security becomes so extensive, so politically influential and so economically entrenched that it begins to reproduce the conditions that justify its own continuation. At that point, peace is no longer simply a desirable outcome. It becomes an institutional disruption.
This is a particularly dangerous inversion of purpose. Institutions established to protect societies can become invested in the permanence of the conditions from which they derive their power and resources. The result is not necessarily that those institutions actively seek war. More dangerously, it’s that their assumptions, incentives and operating arrangements can make the prevention of war less central than the preparation for it. A system can become extraordinarily efficient at managing conflict while becoming progressively less capable of resolving it as we have seen over the past two decades.
The manufacture of adversaries: China and the return of bloc thinking
It’s in this wider context that the increasingly confrontational posture towards China must be examined. The assumption that China’s rise must inevitably constitute a threat to the West is neither self-evident nor strategically smart. It’s a political interpretation, shaped by particular interests, historical anxieties and a worldview that continues to interpret international relations primarily through the lens of rivalry, containment and dominance.
China is a major economic, technological and geopolitical power. Its growing influence will inevitably challenge established arrangements and require other countries to adapt. There are legitimate disagreements about its policies, military posture, human rights record, trade practices and regional ambitions. These matters can and should be addressed openly and without sentimentality. But disagreement is not the same as enmity. Competition is not the same as war. And the emergence of a different centre of power doesn’t automatically constitute an existential threat to everyone whose influence it may diminish.
The assumption that China must be contained, encircled or opposed at every turn risks transforming a complex relationship into a permanent strategic confrontation. It also creates the very kind of security dilemma that has made great-power conflict so dangerous throughout history. One country’s military preparations are interpreted by another as evidence of hostile intent. The second country responds by strengthening its own capabilities. Those preparations are then presented as confirmation of the original threat. Each side can claim to be acting defensively while contributing to an environment in which the possibility of conflict steadily increases. The logic becomes self-validating.
The spectacle in Shenzhen this week complicates that picture without dissolving it. Three leaders whose governments describe one another as principal threats exchanged handshakes and warm words on the sidelines of a regional summit. Yet nothing announced so far touches the procurement programmes, basing agreements or deterrence doctrines built on the assumption of rivalry. Amity at the summit and armament in the budget can coexist for years, because the second answers to institutions the first barely reaches. And when great powers do find common ground, it isn’t always good news for those outside the room, whose futures may be settled in an hour’s conversation they weren’t invited to join.
That’s not to deny that China has its own strategic interests or that other countries have legitimate security concerns. Nor is it to suggest that every action by Beijing should be accepted without scrutiny. It’s to recognise that a relationship between major powers need not be organised around the assumption that one must prevail at the expense of the other. The world is not obliged to choose between American and Chinese dominance. Nor should the future of humanity be held hostage to the strategic anxieties and vanity of competing empires.
There is an alternative: a genuinely multipolar world in which different political systems, economic arrangements and cultural traditions coexist, negotiate, compete and collaborate without assuming that their differences must eventually be settled by military force.
That would require a very different conception of power. It would require the recognition that security can be strengthened through cooperation, that sovereignty is not a zero-sum proposition and that the legitimacy of another nation’s independence does not depend on whether its political system resembles one’s own. Opposing China simply because it is China is not a strategy. As I have said so often and in differing contexts, it’s an abdication of strategic imagination.
AUKUS: Australia’s strategic folly
The implications for Australia are especially serious. AUKUS has been presented as a major strategic response to an increasingly uncertain regional environment. Its supporters argue that it will strengthen Australia’s defence capabilities, deepen technological cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom, and provide a more credible contribution to regional security.
Those arguments deserve examination. Australia has legitimate defence requirements, and no responsible government should ignore the possibility of military conflict in its region. But there’s a profound difference between maintaining the capacity to defend one’s country and organising one’s strategic future around an “Alice-in-Wonderland” expectation that a major war is increasingly likely.
Negotiated behind closed doors, AUKUS represents a long-term commitment to an increasingly militarised conception of Australia’s security environment. It deepens Australia’s integration into the strategic posture of the United States and the United Kingdom, while binding a significant part of its future defence planning to arrangements whose central rationale is the management of great-power competition.
The cost of the submarines and the industrial strain of building them are real enough. More troubling is the strategic dependency that comes with them. AUKUS would deepen a reliance that began long ago. Since the late 1960s, Pine Gap has tied Australian territory to American intelligence and targeting in conflicts Canberra neither starts nor controls, under a doctrine of “full knowledge and concurrence” whose capacity to say no has never been demonstrated in public. When the government insisted this year that Australia took no part in the strikes on Iran, the facility outside Alice Springs made that claim hard to believe. The submarines would extend the same arrangement beneath the sea, binding maintenance, fuel and operational know-how to another nation’s industrial base for decades. Australia risks giving away what remains of its independent judgement at the very moment when diplomatic independence and regional intelligence are most needed.
There’s a further inheritance the submarines leave behind. Australia has agreed to take sole responsibility for the spent fuel from their reactors, uranium enriched to weapons grade, which will remain lethal for longer than any human institution has endured. The government has said only that it will be stored on Defence land, current or future, somewhere remote from populations. A process for choosing that site was promised within a year in 2023. It has yet to appear, while legislation already allows the Defence Minister to declare almost anywhere in the country a nuclear facility. In Australia, “remote” has rarely meant empty. It usually means country held by Aboriginal people, whose objections to radioactive waste have been overridden before, until the Barngarla took the Commonwealth to court over Kimba and won. Some of those communities still live with the legacy of Maralinga, where Britain tested atomic weapons on their land seventy years ago. Britain is now a partner in AUKUS. The same alliance asks the same people to accept the residue of a strategy written elsewhere, this time for millennia.
Geography and common sense should make Australia a natural bridge between different political and cultural worlds. Its future prosperity is inseparable from its relationships across Asia, including its relationship with China. Yet an increasingly binary strategic outlook encourages Australians to see their regional future through the assumptions of a distant great-power rivalry.
This is a grievous mistake. Fear is the currency with which commitments of this size are bought. AUKUS was sold as an answer to China, and for several years the answer seemed to need its question kept vivid: front pages counting down to war, ministers describing the most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War, security agencies warning of interference everywhere and rarely seen. The public appears to be tiring of it. This year’s Lowy Institute Poll found that six in ten Australians now regard China more as an economic partner than a threat, and for the first time more of them rate the relationship with Beijing above the one with Washington. Yet the submarines, the waste and the decades of dependency remain fixed in place, long after the sentiment that justified them began to drain away.
A second fear is more corrosive than the first. A security debate built around a single adversary invites citizens to look sideways at one another. Chinese-Australians, more than a million people woven through every part of national life, have watched their loyalty become a matter for public speculation. In a submission to this year’s inquiry into AUKUS, the scholar Wanning Sun described a community that has largely fallen silent, wary that dissent might be read as foreign interference. The chill doesn’t stop at one community. Anyone who questions the pact risks being cast as naive at best, and at worst as an unwitting instrument of Beijing. A country taught to fear its neighbour has begun to fear what its own citizens might say.
Australia can maintain a credible defence capability without treating China as an unavoidable enemy. It can cooperate with the United States without assuming that every American strategic objective must become an Australian priority. It can protect its sovereignty without compromising its capacity to exercise independent foreign policy.
Indeed, genuine sovereignty requires exactly that capacity. A country that becomes so strategically dependent on another power that it can’t independently assess the circumstances in which it might be drawn into war has weakened one of the key factors its defence policy is supposed to protect.
The purpose of Australian security policy should be to preserve Australia’s independence, prosperity and peaceful relationships, not to make the country an increasingly committed participant in a confrontation between great powers. AUKUS may strengthen particular military capabilities. But military capability is not synonymous with strategic wisdom. A country can become better equipped for war while becoming less capable of preventing one. That’s the folly at the heart of Australia’s present strategic predicament.
The intellectual architecture of permanent conflict
The persistence of “forever war” is not sustained by military institutions and commercial interests alone. It’s also prolonged by the intellectual frameworks through which governments, advisers and commentators interpret the world. Possibly more so, given the part fear and paranoia play.
Public figures such as Jeffrey Sachs and John Mearsheimer have made important contributions to the debate about American power, China, Russia and the dangers of military escalation. Their influence is significant partly because they challenge conventional accounts of international affairs, but also because their contrasting perspectives reveal the limits of the intellectual frameworks through which geopolitical conflict is mostly understood.
Sachs challenges the assumption that the United States must preserve global dominance through containment and military alliances. He has argued that efforts to contain China are misguided and dangerous, and that the resulting tensions could bring the world closer to war. His emphasis on diplomacy, economic cooperation and respect for national sovereignty is relevant to any serious attempt to restore peaceful coexistence.
Mearsheimer approaches the same landscape from a very different intellectual position. His theory of offensive realism holds that great powers operate in an international system where they cannot be certain of one another’s intentions or future behaviour. They therefore seek to maximise their relative power and prevent competitors from becoming dominant in strategically important regions. He has argued that the United States should contain China to prevent it from becoming the regional hegemon in Asia.
Both perspectives illuminate important aspects of the problem. Sachs draws attention to the dangers of hegemonic ambition and the tendency to interpret another country’s growing influence as a threat. Mearsheimer explains the strategic logic through which powerful states compete, balance against one another and seek to prevent rivals from acquiring dominance.
But their differences expose a deeper intellectual difficulty. Sachs challenges the consequences of dominance, while Mearsheimer explains the strategic logic that perpetuates its pursuit. Yet explaining why powerful states compete is not the same as establishing that they must remain trapped in perpetual competition.
When rivalry is treated as inevitable, containment becomes a rational response. When containment becomes policy, military alliances expand and weapons accumulate. Other powers respond to what they perceive as encirclement or strategic threat. Their responses are then cited as evidence that the original policy was justified. The reasoning becomes circular. Each side’s preparations for security become the other’s justification for insecurity. This is how a security dilemma can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, with commentators and advisers sometimes reinforcing the assumptions from which it’s harder to escape.
To be clear, Mearsheimer does not advocate initiating a war with China. He presents containment as an alternative to war, rather than a programme of military aggression. But a distinction between intending to avoid war and adopting a policy that may increase the risk of war deserves serious interrogation. A strategy can be defensive in its declared purpose and escalatory in its consequences.
Nor should Sachs’s arguments be accepted uncritically. His criticism of American foreign policy is often forceful, but claims about the motives behind particular decisions must still be tested against evidence. Complex conflicts rarely have a single cause, and no major power should be exempt from scrutiny simply because it’s being criticised by another.
The responsibility of intellectuals should extend beyond explaining the mechanics of geopolitical rivalry. It should include challenging the assumptions that make rivalry appear to be the only realistic organising principle of international affairs.
There’s a profound difference between being realistic about the existence of conflict and accepting conflict as the permanent condition of human society. The former is an obligation of responsible analysis. The latter, once again, is an abdication of political imagination as well as, on this occasion, adequate scholarship.
We need advisers capable of imagining an international order in which security is not measured primarily by the capacity to dominate, alliances are not organised around the presumed necessity of confronting an enemy, and the rise of another nation does not automatically become a threat to our own existence. Otherwise, even the most sophisticated analysis of geopolitics risks becoming an elaborate explanation of why the world can’t change. And that, in its own way, becomes part of the problem.
The human cost and the moral asymmetry
Behind the strategic calculations, institutional incentives and economic interests lies the stark human experience of war. Civilians don’t experience conflict as a contest between doctrines or a demonstration of geopolitical resolve. They experience it as the destruction of their homes, schools, hospitals, livelihoods and communities. They lose family members. They are displaced. They live with trauma, injury, and the permanent consequences of violence.
Soldiers, too, pay a terrible price. Many are young people who have little influence over the political decisions that place them in danger. They carry the physical and psychological consequences of conflicts whose purposes may become increasingly difficult to explain.
The distribution of these costs is profoundly unequal. Those who make decisions about war are rarely the people who bear its greatest physical consequences. Political leaders may leave office. Military commanders may retire. Contractors may continue to prosper. Yet the consequences for families and communities can endure for generations.
International humanitarian law exists partly to recognise that even in war there are obligations that can’t be abandoned. The distinction between combatants and civilians, the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and the requirement of proportionality are not optional standards to be invoked selectively against adversaries. They are fundamental duties. No country’s military superiority gives it permission to disregard them. No government’s claim to self-defence removes its obligations towards civilian populations. And no act of retaliation automatically legitimises the killing of innocent people.
The moral credibility of any state is measured not only by the reasons it gives for going to war, but by the restraints it’s prepared to observe when exercising force. A world in which the powerful increasingly treat civilian destruction as an unfortunate but acceptable consequence of strategic objectives is a world in which the foundations of international order are being steadily corroded. Moral authority is eroding with them, though much of the world would question whether the powerful ever possessed it, or only claimed it. Seen from Baghdad or Gaza, the “rules-based order” has often looked like rules for others and exemptions for its authors. Each war fought in its name, each civilian death explained away as regrettable but necessary, has widened the gap between what was professed and what was done. Authority of that kind can’t be bombed back into existence. Once a state’s word stops meaning what it says, its weapons become its only means of persuasion, and they persuade nobody of anything beyond their own reach.
The civilisational contradiction
There’s something almost incomprehensible about the contrast between humanity’s extraordinary scientific and technological achievements and the purposes to which so much of that ingenuity is now being put. We possess the knowledge and capability to develop new sources of energy, restore damaged ecosystems, improve public health, eradicate preventable diseases, expand education, reduce poverty and create the conditions for a more equitable and sustainable civilisation. We can communicate instantaneously across continents, map the human genome, explore distant planets and develop forms of artificial intelligence that may transform almost every dimension of human activity. Yet enormous intellectual, scientific, industrial and financial resources continue to be mobilised around the development of ever more sophisticated means of killing one another.
The paradox is not simply that we have failed to abolish war. It’s that we have normalised the preparation for war to such an extent that it’s often treated as a more realistic and responsible undertaking than the preparation for peace.
Military budgets are discussed as necessities. Weapons systems are celebrated as achievements of technological ingenuity. And strategic confrontation is framed as evidence of political gravitas. By contrast, diplomacy is too often regarded as an adjunct to military power rather than an essential expression of political intelligence. It’s summoned once the shooting has started, to broker ceasefires and count the dead, when its deeper purpose lies in the patient, unglamorous labour of keeping disputes from hardening into wars at all. That labour leaves no monument. A war averted produces no footage and no contracts, which may be why so few budgets make room for averting one.
This reveals something deeper about the civilisation we are creating. A society’s priorities are ultimately expressed in how it allocates its intelligence, its collective imagination and its resources. When the most sophisticated capabilities of human ingenuity are directed predominantly towards the capacity to destroy, and while the capacity to sustain life remains inadequately funded and politically marginal, we should not be surprised by the dysfunction that follows.
The problem is not that humanity lacks the means to create a better world. It’s that our institutions remain organised around assumptions that repeatedly obstruct that possibility. We have become extraordinarily accomplished at preparing for the consequences of our own failures, while remaining strangely reluctant to question the systems and beliefs that produce them.
Restoring peace as the default
This brings me to a proposition that should be central to any serious reconsideration of international security. Peace must become the default condition of international relations, not a brief interval between wars, a concession made after military exhaustion, or a reward offered to those who have been defeated.
Might it also mean abandoning national defence? The question is rarely admitted into strategic conversation, yet it deserves an answer rather than a reflex. Several countries have already done without armies and endured, though usually beneath someone else’s shelter. That dependence is itself instructive. Security has always been borrowed, pooled and shared far more than any nation likes to admit, and the self-sufficient fortress state is largely an expensive fiction.
Peace as the default wouldn’t require pretending that aggression never happens or that every political difference can be reconciled. It would require something harder: treating armed force as the residue of failed prevention, never the foundation on which everything else is built, and asking each time a budget grows whether the threat it answers is real or whether the habit of answering has become its own justification.
Peace is not passivity. It is not weakness. It is not the absence of strategic thinking. On the contrary, peace requires a higher order of strategic intelligence than the capacity to wage war. It requires historical comprehension, cultural literacy, diplomatic ingenuity, restraint, tolerance and the ability to recognise the legitimate interests of others without assuming that those interests must be subordinated to one’s own.
It requires governments to understand that security is not created simply by accumulating weapons, expanding alliances and identifying new adversaries. Security also emerges from trust, economic interdependence, stable relationships, mutual respect and institutions capable of resolving disputes before they become violent. The strategic intelligence of a nation should therefore be measured not only by its ability to deter or defeat an adversary, but by its ability to prevent the conditions that make war necessary.
For Australia, this means recovering an independent strategic inventiveness. It means refusing to accept that the country’s future must be defined by the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. It means maintaining relationships across the region, investing in diplomacy and preserving the freedom to make decisions in Australia’s own national interests.
For the United States, it means recognising that global hegemony cannot be sustained indefinitely through coercion, military superiority or the naive assumption that other nations must accept its preferred political order. Influence earned through cooperation is more durable than obedience extracted through force.
For China, Russia, Iran and every other major power, the same principle applies. No country should be exempt from the obligations of restraint, respect for sovereignty and the protection of civilian life. A more peaceful international order cannot be built by replacing one form of dominance with another.
As for the wider international community, it means challenging the idea that perpetual military preparedness is the highest expression of responsible government. A civilisation that prepares perpetually for war will eventually organise its institutions, economies, political relationships and collective imagination around the expectation of conflict. What begins as a precaution can become a road to self-destruction.
The longer this continues, the harder it becomes to imagine any alternative. Generations grow accustomed to the language of enemies, threats, deterrence and military necessity. Political leaders inherit assumptions they rarely challenge. Economic interests become embedded in the business of confrontation. And the possibility of peaceful coexistence is progressively displaced by the management of permanent insecurity. That’s how the business of “forever war” becomes more than an industry. It becomes a worldview and world-system on autopilot.
The ultimate insanity
The tragedy of forever war is not simply that governments repeatedly make disastrous decisions, or that military campaigns produce consequences their architects fail to anticipate. It’s that entire systems can become so entangled in the continuation of conflict that they gradually lose the capacity to imagine a world organised around something other than confrontation.
The apparatus of war begins to define the meaning of security. The interests that benefit from military expenditure become embedded in political decision-making. The assumptions of strategic dominance become indistinguishable from national interest. Eventually, the capacity to destroy is mistaken for the capacity to lead. The result is a profound inversion of purpose.
Institutions created to protect civilisation can end up undermining the very conditions on which it depends.
Perhaps the greatest danger of “forever wars” is not simply that governments become incapable of making peace, but that entire political and economic systems gradually become dependent on the absence of peace. And when that happens, peace itself becomes a threat to the very interests that claim to be fighting for it.
That’s the ultimate insanity of “forever war”: a system ostensibly designed to protect civilisation can become so bound up with the machinery of its own impairment that it loses the capacity to envisage, let alone create, the conditions for peace.
The task confronting us all is therefore much larger than ending any single conflict. It is to challenge the political, economic and intellectual assumptions that make permanent conflict appear normal, necessary and inevitable. We must stop treating peace as the fortunate outcome of military calculations and restore it as the default mechanism for international relations.
The measure of a nation’s strategic intelligence, including ours, should not be how effectively it prepares to fight the next war, but how intelligently it works to ensure that the war never becomes necessary.
